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Abstract 
This chapter will consider how the elements of continuity and change in British 
foreign policy that emerged under the current Labour government will be managed in 
the short to medium term and ask what their fuller implications for the UK and 
European security may be in the longer run.  The paper will examine how the change 
that transpired after 1997 which saw a new pro-European stance on security can be 
reconciled with the prevailing continuities in British strategic culture, namely 
Britain’s special relationship with the US, its global role and as demonstrated in the 
case of Iraq, the UK’s negation of Franco-German security initiatives.  The paper 
will also emphasise the central importance of the UK’s commitment to the EU’s 
security policy ambitions, given that the UK armed forces are the most capable in 
Europe and as confirmed in Iraq, an ESDP without a UK contribution would have no 
credibility. Despite Blair’s policy overtures towards developing greater European 
military capabilities, the continued reliance on the USA has meant that British 





The United Kingdom’s attitude towards the use of armed force has been conditioned 
by a series of cultural and historical factors. Strategic culture has not remained static 
in the British case, but has gone through a process of incremental change to meet new 
challenges and new circumstances. British strategic culture, especially since 1945, has 
also emerged from a series of often conflicting pressures which British policy makers 
have had to balance – namely, the pull of Europeanist and Atlanticist visions of 
security and defence policy, coupled with the incremental reconceptualisation of the 
role of the armed forces in British foreign policy. Thus British strategic culture has 
sought to follow a course between the extremes of Atlanticism and Europeanism, 
which has had a substantial bearing on the use of the UK armed forces in the post-
Cold War world. Of particular interest to this paper is the role played by Tony Blair 
and the Labour government since 1997 in outlining a new foreign policy direction for 
the UK, which has had a significant impact on the constitution of the UK’s foreign 
policy and the role of the armed forces. 
 
The British-American security relationship has had a profound influence on 
how the use of force is viewed under the Blair government, which has caused an 
imbalance in Tony Blair’s attempts to develop European capabilities in order to 
strengthen transatlantic burden sharing. The doctrine of pre-emption as outlined in 
President George W Bush’s National Security Strategy has had a significant impact 
on the role of the UK’s armed forces by calling into question the United Nations 
Charter’s clauses on the use of force in the international community.2 The principle of 
pre-emption and Blair’s support of the pre-emptive war against Iraq in 2003 has 
significantly shifted the conditions under which the British armed forces may be used, 
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despite the widespread concern of several of the UK’s key partners, namely France 
and Germany. The ramifications of American influence on the Iraq issue is that the 
UK has more overtly  followed American military planning in the run up to the Iraq 
war, during the conflict and in the post-conflict phase, rather than playing an 
influential operational role in tandem with the USA.3
 
After considering the central tenets of the UK’s strategic culture, this article 
will highlight the exogenous pressures which the UK has come under since the end of 
the Cold War to assess to what extent the UK’s position has shifted to meet new 
international challenges. The UK remains a key actor in NATO and EU security 
policy. The UK’s aim has been to attempt to shape the development of both the EU 
and NATO to deal with the security concerns of the 21st century to fit with UK 
strategic culture and national interests. However, America’s retreat from multilateral 
institutions and the Franco-German opposition to war on Iraq has left the UK in a 
vulnerable position in which its ability to influence both the development of the 
Common European Security and Defence Policy and American policy have gone 
through short-term difficulties. 
 
Central historical tenets of UK strategic culture 
Longhurst defines strategic culture as, 
… a distinctive body of beliefs, attitudes and practices regarding the use of 
force, which are held by a collective (usually a nation) and arise gradually 
over time, through a unique and protracted historical process. Strategic 
culture is persistent over time, tending to outlast the era of its original 
inception, although it is not a permanent or static feature. It is shaped and 
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influenced by formative periods and can alter, either fundamentally or 
piecemeal, at critical junctures in that collective’s experiences.4
 
For the UK, strategic culture defines the boundaries and conditions within which the 
British Armed Forces may be used as part of an overall foreign policy strategy. The 
British Defence Doctrine states that,  
…the UK’s military strategic doctrine has to be sufficiently flexible to cope 
with shifts in perceptions of national interest reflected in policy. Those 
perceptions will not only change over time, they will be different to different 
groups within the state.5
Whilst the British Defence Doctrine recognises the fluidity of British strategic 
culture, the UK has displayed remarkable continuity in its foreign policy and change 
only occurs incrementally. There are a number of central tenets of British strategic 
culture. Throughout the course of the twentieth century the UK has gone from being a 
major colonial power, been subjected to the horrors of fighting two world wars and 
had to deal with the constraints and threats associated with the Cold War era. The 
dramatic loss of relative power which UK suffered as a result of the costs of fighting 
two world wars within a 30 year period, necessitated a foreign policy in which the UK 
sought to ‘punch above its own weight’.6  
 
The multilateral structures which emerged after World War Two, the United 
Nations, Western European Union and in particular NATO, were key to British 
foreign and security policy during the Cold War, reinforcing in the minds of the 
British people and the political elites, the importance of the transatlantic link. The 
UK’s commitment to the Atlantic Alliance and its ties with the United States formed 
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the cornerstone of British strategic culture during the Cold War, as well as in its 
global role as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. The UK consistently 
sought to develop interoperability with American forces to ensure high levels of 
military capability and developed close links between the American and British 
intelligence communities.7 To a marked degree, this was undertaken to maintain the 
levels of interoperability between American and British troops which was developed 
during World War Two. Another cornerstone of the UK’s commitment to the NATO 
alliance was the British nuclear deterrent which constitutes a key facet of British 
strategic culture. Membership of the nuclear club, within the framework of American 
extended deterrence was essential to British defence during the Cold War, despite 
occasional political tensions.8
 
Strategic culture during the Cold War was indelibly linked with NATO and 
America, during which time there were only the beginnings of loose European foreign 
policy co-ordination outside of the NATO framework in the form of European 
Political Co-operation.9 Defence and security policy during the Cold War was 
centrally concerned with maintaining the status quo, with the British armed forces 
concentrating on the defence of the realm and the NATO area from the Soviet threat. 
The UK sought to pursue its foreign policy agenda multilaterally, through NATO and 
the United Nations, and through the European Community from 1973. Ultimately, it 
was through multilateralism that the UK was able to maintain its influence throughout 
the Cold War period, backed up by its highly trained and respected military, playing a 
key role in NATO affairs. 
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It is important to note that by following a course of multilateralism the UK has 
become inextricably linked to the European security community.10 This has 
intensified as the need to find European answers to questions facing Europe’s security 
establishment has grown since the end of the Soviet threat. The security community 
that has emerged in Europe has been described by Buzan and Waever as being 
constituted of,  
…a set of units whose major processes of securitisation, desecuritization, or 
both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be 
analysed or resolved apart from one another.11
The singular strategic cultures which have emerged within the EU Member States are 
therefore to a certain extent mutually constitutive and reinforcing, as they are working 
within the same structures and are buffeted by the same foreign policy challenges. 
The end of the Cold War fundamentally changed the political map of Europe and 
changed the role of the UK armed forces. As Longhurst states above, strategic culture 
is relatively resistant to change, except in cases of substantial transformation in the 
context in which policy concerning the use of force is made. As this article will 
outline, the end of the Cold War did not reduce the importance of the armed forces. 
Rather they have had to adapt to working within multinational crisis management 
operations and to the development to new NATO and EU military structures. 
The post-Cold War era – redefining British Strategic Culture 
The end of the Cold War marked the beginning of an incremental strategic shift for 
British strategic culture. William Wallace noted in the immediate aftermath of the 
Cold War that, “In a transformed world order, British foreign policy requires a new 
rationale.’12 No longer faced with a threat from the Soviet Union, the UK and its 
partners were faced with new security policy challenges with the break-up of the 
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Soviet empire. It is through the UK’s multilateral ties that Britain has been able to 
redefine the role of the British armed forces in the post-Cold War era, moving from 
static defence centred in Europe, to flexible forces deployable around the globe. 
Central to this shift have been debates concerning the institutional architecture of 
European security policy. These developments as we shall see have been key in 
redefining British strategic culture. As this article will show, British strategic culture 
in terms of foreign and security policy has gone through a process of incremental 
reframing since the advent of the first Labour government in 1997, but the principles 
underlying the use of the armed forces have displayed relative continuity. 
 
Shifts in UK strategic culture have coincided with the major debates affecting 
security institutions in Europe during the 1990s.13 The UK has been a major player in 
these discussions revolving around the future of NATO in the post-Cold War era, and 
in the debates concerning the development of European military capabilities in the 
aftermath of the Kosovo war in 1998-1999.14 The UK’s traditional role as a mediator 
between American and European concerns over security and defence policy has come 
to the fore in recasting the transatlantic security commitments of the Cold War period 
to fit the new world order.15
 
The need to move from static defence to rapidly deployable forces has been 
readily grasped by the UK, which has streamlined its armed forces from 315,000 to 
210,000 personnel, and sought to divert spending into equipment suitable for rapid 
and flexible deployment around the globe. This has partly been as result of 
diminishing defence budgets in the aftermath of the Cold War, but also as a reaction 
to new strategic imperatives. As part of this process the United Kingdom was 
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instrumental in pushing for the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) arrangement 
within NATO as a central pillar of developing a more active European role within the 
alliance in the form of the European Security and Defence Initiative (ESDI).16 The 
CJTF arrangement was also an attempt to offset questioning in some quarters of 
NATO’s predominance as the key security institution in post-Cold War Europe. 
Attempts to address this question have been central to NATO’s move away from a 
predominantly collective defence orientation under Article V of the Washington 
Treaty, to more flexible crisis management operations.  
 
Key to this reconceptualisation of defence and the role of the British armed 
forces was the UK’s experiences in the former Yugoslavia throughout the 1990s, as 
well as involvement in Iraq, Sierra Leone, East Timor and Afghanistan. The move 
towards creating multinational, rapidly deployable forces has been a dynamic in 
evidence in both NATO and the EU, with the development of the NATO Reaction 
Force (NRF) and the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) respectively. 
Consequently, British policy has been to move towards reinforcing interoperability, 
predominantly with the USA, in order to function effectively as part of multinational 
crisis management operations – and to reinforce what is referred to in defence jargon, 
‘network enabled capability’.17 In a recent speech to the Royal United Services 
Institute, the Defence Minister Geoff Hoon suggested that interoperability with the 
American armed forces was the priority.18 The close relationship between the British 
and American defence establishments is a central pillar of the UK’s strategic culture, 
which is sure to continue and act as a brake on wide ranging Europeanisation within 
the Ministry of Defence and the British Armed Forces.19
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The Strategic Defence Review 1998 sought to outline the post-Cold War 
conditions affecting British defence policy, a review which had already begun under 
the Major government.20 Fundamental to the review’s findings was that the UK no 
longer faced a direct threat, and therefore defence planning and capabilities needed to 
adapt to new circumstances and challenges. The implication of the SDR 1998 was that 
the UK was not exposed to any clearly defined threat since the passing of the Cold 
War. The UK’s armed forces therefore had moved from a defensive orientation to one 
founded on their international role in peacekeeping on a global level. There was a 
clear strategic shift away from Cold War policy to meet the challenges of a disorderly 
world with the emphasis on rapidly deployable forces to work within multilateral, 
predominantly NATO, settings. The claim that the UK faced no clear threats was 
abandoned with the Strategic Defence Review New Chapter of 2002 and the Defence 
White Paper of 2003 which were prompted by the 11th September 2001 attacks on 
New York and Washington and the subsequent war in Afghanistan and the overthrow 
of Sadam Hussein.21
 
The UK’s colonial past, coupled with its institutional embedding in the 
international community, has created a sense of responsibility and global outlook in 
the minds of the British public and political elites regarding the UK’s international 
responsibilities for peacekeeping and crisis management. There are no obvious ‘no go 
areas’ for the UK armed forces in the way that the German armed forces are 
constrained. A recent example of this was the UK’s involvement in the EU’s 
Operation Artemis in Bunia in the Democratic Republic of Congo (although the 
headquarters were based in Entebbe, Uganda) where the EU troops were deployed to 
assist the UN’s humanitarian operation in the region (MONUC). The UK was 
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supportive of the mission and encouraged France to Europeanise the operation rather 
than conduct it on a looser multilateral basis.22 Despite this, German officials were 
extremely reluctant to consider the deployment of Bundeswehr troops for fear that this 
would create a precedent concerning the deployment of the Bundeswehr in Africa, 
and raising negative connotations of a new Afrikacorps.23
 
The British armed forces have been characterised by their pragmatism and 
flexibility since the end of the Cold War. The British armed forces also work within a 
very wide operational remit, which can include a range of operational activities from 
war fighting to anti-drug smuggling operations – a range of issues which the British 
Defence Doctrine outlines falls within a ‘continuum of conflict’ in which the armed 
forces might be called to operate.24 British defence doctrine uses the idea of a 
spectrum of tension, with peace at one extreme and war at the other.25 This versatility 
has been vital in how the armed forces are deployed to meet contemporary security 
challenges. 
Blair’s influence on the UK’s strategic culture  
Since 1997 Prime Minister Tony Blair has embarked on a series of substantial foreign 
and security policy projects which have had the potential to significantly impact on 
the UK’s strategic culture. The four central developments which have impacted upon 
security and defence policy have been the decision to commit more fully to building 
European military capabilities in crisis management within the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP) framework, Blair’s commitment to a more interventionist 
style of foreign policy, his continued commitment to the transatlantic security 
relationship, and finally, the desire to frame these developments, were possible, within 
an integrated foreign policy reflecting social democratic values. Central to this section 
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is the development of the Blair doctrine of international community which has 
committed the UK to greater levels of intervention on a global scale. Whilst Blair has 
attempted to balance his commitments to the European Union and the United States, 
the Iraq war in 2003 has made clear that in military terms, the UK remains firmly 
wedded to the transatlantic relationship. 
Central tenets of Blairite foreign and security policy 
Blair sought to redefine British foreign policy on taking office in 1997 which has had 
a significant impact on the role of the armed forces. The implication of Blair’s new 
approach to foreign and security policy has been a renewed commitment to military 
intervention as a means to back diplomacy. In order to pursue such a strategy, Blair 
has sought to maintain transatlantic security structures by attempting to create 
mutually reinforcing military structures in the European Union and NATO. Blair’s 
doctrine of international community represents an important shift in British foreign 
policy as it disregards the sanctity of national sovereignty based on the Westphalian 
states system in cases where nation-states have systematically sought to abuse the 
rights of individuals or groups within their territory.26 This is fundamentally a shift in 
the conditions under which the UK will consider the use of force. During Blair’s time 
in office, the armed forces have been deployed in Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia and 
Kosovo, deployments which have taken some impetus from Blair’s internationalist 
doctrine. This shift in strategic culture has not always met with support within the 
British population as a whole.27 This new form of interventionism also raises doubts 
within the international legal community, regarding the legality of such a strategy.28
 
Robert Cooper’s call for a new liberal imperialism, suggesting that the post-
modern West should be more willing to intervene in the modern, less-developed 
 11
world, fits with Blair’s interventionist ideals.29 The existence of a embedded system 
of governance in the North and West founded on common institutions and shared 
values, with their holistic views on the security concept and relatively porous national 
borders, is markedly different, according to Cooper, to the less developed world 
where anarchy is more pronounced in the international system and traditional inter-
state competition remains.30 A nexus between the desire to connect domestic and 
international issues to address the challenges of the international community through a 
strategy of integrated foreign policy, an interventionist approach based on Blair’s 
conception of international community, a belief in developing more adequate burden-
sharing within the transatlantic security community, and the continued aim to 
promote the UK’s international interest has characterised Blair’s approach to foreign 
policy during his time in office. Blair has consistently sought to explain his foreign 
and security policy through this nexus, even if at times it appears highly contradictory. 
 
Insert Figure 1 About Here 
 
The Labour government has also sought to place a social democratic accent on 
foreign and security policy during its time in office.31 This has involved pushing 
Labour’s idea of integrated foreign policy. Essentially, Blair’s approach to integrated 
foreign policy implies that, 
‘…for all the threats of terrorism and international security, the only true path 
to lasting peace is to be united also in recognising that without those values of 
social justice, solidarity, opportunity and security for all, the world will never 
prosper or be fully at peace’32  
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The implication of such a policy is that a wide range of domestic and foreign policy 
instruments can be mobilised to deal with the challenges facing the global community. 
Fundamentally, the social democratic Progressive Governance forum promotes a 
three-pronged foreign policy strategy of empowering citizens, providing opportunities 
to people around the globe to improve their social conditions, and stressing the 
responsibility of social democratic states to work towards these goals as a central 
pillar of their respective foreign policy platforms.33 One clear example of this is in the 
EU’s response to the threat from international terrorism. Despite Blair’s support of the 
American-led war in Iraq in 2003, the UK has sought, albeit it with varying degrees of 
consistency and engagement, to work with its EU partners through the framework of 
Justice and Home Affairs as a means to tackle terrorism, involving issues such as 
immigration which traditionally have fallen under the sole competence of national 
administrations, and trying to address the problems of social exclusion and poverty in 
countries where terrorism has taken root. 
 
The Labour Party has sought to balance its obligation to the hard security 
measures with a commitment to the spread of human rights and prosperity.34 Robin 
Cook’s declaration of an Ethical Foreign Policy was driven not only by personal 
convictions and those of his party, but also in order to create a degree of political 
distance from the last Conservative party government which had been dogged by 
scandals, often relating to arms dealing.35 As a consequence an Ethical Defence 
Export Policy was developed to attempt to codify the arms export policy in the UK.36 
A moral or and ethical component of foreign policy under the Labour government 
since 1997 has been to the fore in its desire to forge, if only at a rhetorical level, an 
integrated foreign policy approach. 
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Moving towards Europe 
Where the Blair government has attempted to challenge traditional British strategic 
culture and the policies of the previous Thatcher and Major Conservative 
governments has been in its determination to use European instruments to achieve 
some of its foreign policy goals and to develop a more interventionist foreign policy 
in terms of crisis management and conflict prevention around the globe.37 Lessons 
learned in Bosnia relating to the difficulty surrounding the deployment of troops in 
multinational units also encouraged Blair to seek improved co-operation with his 
European partners. This has been within the context of a reassessment of the Labour 
Party relationship with the European Union since the Policy Review Process 
undertaken after its third straight election defeat in 1987.38
 
One of Prime Minster Blair’s central foreign policy foci since arriving in 
office in 1997 has been the decision to commit to developing European military 
capabilities as part of ESDP. The Franco-British St Malo agreement of December 
1998 marked a definitive change, or a volte face in Hill’s view, in British strategic 
culture, as it opened up the possibility of developing autonomous European military 
capabilities.39 Tony Blair saw the emergence of a greater European commitment to 
burden-sharing with the United States in security policy as a way to influence Europe 
by shaping the development of the ESDP and balance American security relations by 
proving more suitable and useful strategic partners. This marks a shift in strategic 
culture within the UK because during the Cold War and in its immediate aftermath, 
questioning the absolute centrality of NATO and America’s role in European security 
affairs was considered anathema in Whitehall.40
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Blair’s commitment to the creation of European Union military capabilities 
emerged from the idea that, 
Europe needs genuine military operational capability - not least forces able to 
react quickly and work together effectively - and genuine political will. 
Without these, we will always be talking about an empty shell. But we also 
need to check the institutions are right. To decide how the EU, WEU and 
NATO can best mesh together.41
Charles Grant, director of the Centre for European Reform in London, and British 
diplomat Robert Cooper were important figures in convincing Blair to press for a 
greater role for the UK in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as a 
way playing a greater leadership role within the EU.42 The acceptance of this proposal 
has impacted significantly on the options open to the UK in foreign and security 
policy, including the option of conducting low-level military operations with the UK’s 
European partners without American involvement. The desire to lead in foreign and 
security policy within the EU was part of a wider British strategy of ‘step-change’ in 
which the UK has sought to improve its position in the EU by developing strategic 
partnerships with other EU member states.43 Blair also recognised that the EU’s 
foreign and security policy was unwieldy and ineffective with cumbersome decision-
making procedures, a belief that was reinforced in Blair’s mind as a result of the 
failure of the EU to deal with the Kosovo problem without US involvement.44 It was 
after the Pörtschach European Council meeting in October 1998 that the British 
approached the French concerning the creation of more credible EU foreign and 
security policy capabilities at St Malo. 
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The context in which strategic culture is expressed within the UK, the 
balancing of Atlanticist and Europeanist interests, has continued to provide British 
diplomats and politicians with a stern test. The Defence White Paper 1999 
recommitted the UK to NATO in light of Blair’s moves towards Europe, and with one 
eye on the symbolism of the fiftieth anniversary of the Atlantic Alliance: 
NATO is crucial for Britain because a vigorous and relevant Atlantic Alliance, 
including an effective European pillar, is essential to our security interests. 
The essential reasons for its formation under the Attlee Government of 50 
years ago endure today. Only by acting with our Allies in Europe and North 
America can we safeguard our future and ensure that no major new military 
threats emerge. NATO has shown that it can act effectively in Bosnia and 
Kosovo.45
 
The political aspects of UK strategic culture have shifted with Blair’s 
commitment to European military capabilities and his doctrine of the international 
community. However, military strategic culture has remained fairly consistent – 
whilst deployment in Afghanistan and Iraq represent major deployments in the war 
against terrorism, the mechanics of conducting these missions have not changed 
substantially. The greatest shift in terms of the military is undoubtedly the necessity to 
work alongside armed forces from other states within multinational operations. The 
prevalence of coalition-led operations, based around an American core, will continue 
to predominate in today’s security environment.46
 
The UK has had a shaping role within the process of establishing the European 
Security and Defence Policy. Central to the UK’s singular stance is the British 
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conviction that capabilities should drive co-operation, rather than efforts to deepen 
integration within the European Union project.47 This is reinforced by the traditions of 
British strategic culture, in which co-operation with European partners has been 
founded primarily on a rationale relating to strategic and military imperatives, rather 
than as part of an overall political process. The UK also retains an exaggerated 
intergovernmentalist attitude towards the role of the armed forces within CFSP, which 
makes it very sensitive to suggestions of developing decision-making structures based 
on Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) or constructive abstention rather than through 
unanimity.48 In many ways, this has resulted in the preference for co-operation with 
the American armed forces, rather than within the Brussels political jungle. However, 
the UK has pledged 12,500 troops, 18 ships and 72 combat planes to the European 
Rapid Reaction Force out of a total of 50,000 - 60,000 troops, making it alongside 
France and Germany, one of the three main backers of the force. The UK has been 
consistently sceptical of developments to duplicate existing NATO structures within 
the EU, such as the Belgian, French, German and Luxembourg proposal for an EU 
planning centre in Tervuren made on the 29th April 2003 in the midst of the 
diplomatic fall-out over the invasion of Iraq. 
 
Public opinion within the UK has often appeared hesitant regarding the 
creation of the ERRF within the ESDP framework.49 As a result Blair has had to 
convince both political elites and the general public of the rationale for such a venture. 
The discourse which Blair uses is almost exclusively centred around the idea that 
European capabilities will strengthen the transatlantic link. Blair also seeks to reassure 
European sceptics that the UK’s strategy will ensure that the transatlantic link is not 
compromised. Speaking at the University of Birmingham, Blair stated that the, 
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… UK has a powerful role to play as a bridge between USA and Europe - we 
are economically strong and politically influential in both. Britain's friendship 
with the United States is an asset for our European partners. We want to be 
fully engaged in a united Europe, working with an internationalist USA.50
Blair underscores that within UK strategic culture, the UK does not seek to choose 
between Europeanist and Atlanticist conceptions of security policy – they can be 
mutually reinforcing projects rather than competitive ventures.51 The difficulty is, that 
the UK is constantly being asked to choose between these two positions by its 
American and EU partners. In the end, CFSP/ESDP represents the ‘ultimate 
compromise’ for the UK in forging stronger transatlantic relations through the 
development of meaningful European military capabilities.52 However, the UK’s 
closest military partner, the USA, doubts the UK’s ability to maintain this 
compromise in the medium to long-term. 
 
The UK continues to understand that CFSP is a nested issue within wider 
discussions on the future of European integration. Blair’s belief that the UK could 
gain across the board within the EU by committing itself to lead in matters relating to 
foreign and security policy has proved sensible. The negotiations revolving around the 
creation of a European Constitution have shown that the UK has extracted 
concessions in other aspects of European integration in return for supporting Franco-
German measures to boost the EU’s military planning capabilities. Blair has also 
attempted to show that he is willing repair relations with EU partners and demonstrate 
that the UK is not overly influenced by America in foreign and security policy.53 It is 
therefore clear that Britain continues to resist substantial Europeanisation of its 
foreign and security policy. 
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 Iraq, the future of ESDP and British Strategic Culture 
 
The war on Iraq unearthed latent divisions within the transatlantic security community 
concerning the use of force. Britain’s ability to balance its Europeanist and Atlanticist 
impulses was put under extreme pressure by the decision to invade Iraq. Whilst the 
threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was the official reason for America 
and the UK to depose Sadam Hussein, Blair sought to justify the UK’s actions in the 
aftermath of the war in terms consistent with his doctrine of international community 
– freeing the Iraqi people from the tyranny of Sadam Hussein’s regime. The attacks 
on the world trade centre on 11th September 2001 also called into question the 
contention as contained within the Strategic Defence Review of 1998 that the UK was 
not open to any substantial threat. This section will examine the implications of the 
war on Iraq in 2003 in order to determine its effect on UK strategic culture and for the 
UK’s future role within ESDP. 
 
Whilst the impact of the war on Iraq on relations between the UK and its 
major European partners France and Germany created tensions, its consequences 
should not be overstated. The divisions over the war in Iraq did not imply a rethink on 
the UK’s part about the usefulness of ESDP, it did, however, prove a sobering 
reminder of the current residual limitations of European foreign and security policy 
co-operation. The fall-out between the UK-USA and France-Germany-Russia was 
inevitably cast within the enduring Atlanticist versus Europeanist debates which had 
received new impetus from Kagan’s provocative text.54 Despite the tension on both 
sides of the Atlantic, measures were taken to repair relationships on a functional level, 
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particularly through Germany’s efforts to extend the remit of NATO’s ISAF 
operations in Afghanistan.  
 
However, the prosecution of the war against Iraq and the embedding of the 
principle of pre-emption within the Bush administration’s strategic options have 
implications for the development of UK strategic culture.55 By continuing on this 
trajectory, the UK risks undoing the work which it has done in the realms of ESDP, 
unless Blair is able to convince his European allies to accept his views, and prove that 
he is fully committed to fulfilling on his goal of greater transatlantic burden-sharing. 
The UK’s consistent support for the Eurofighter-Typhoon project has demonstrated its 
commitment to developing European capabilities. The UK must continue to urge its 
EU partners to develop greater military capabilities and redouble their efforts to find a 
workable solution to the disagreements currently on show between the USA and 
France and Germany. What is clear is that without the UK, ESDP is very limited in 
what it can achieve militarily and more importantly, politically, in world affairs. The 
existing stumbling blocks in EU security policy relate mainly to hard security issues 
revolving around the use of force.  
 
The involvement of the UK armed forces in counter-terrorist measures has not 
fundamentally changed their approach to the use of force. The campaign against 
terrorism has involved the type of operations for which the British army is well 
trained and has a history of fighting. However, Blair’s commitment to support the 
strategy of the United States with the implications which this has in terms of 
international law, has raised questions concerning the role of the UK armed forces. It 
is within this context that opinion within the UK has sought to distance itself from 
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American policy. President Bush’s decision to implement the National Missile 
Defence scheme also has substantial implications on UK strategic policy, especially if 
it chooses to participate in the programme.56
The Impact of UK strategic culture on European defence and the emergence of a 
European Strategic Culture 
Examining strategic cultures of EU member states often uncovers more cause for 
divergence than convergence. Lindley-French has pointed to the ‘strategic 
schizophrenia’ of the EU on issues relating to defence, with the existence of 
minimalist and maximalist conceptions of security – the former equating security to 
purely defensive capabilities whilst the later is geared up to aggressively pursue pre-
emptive security.57 Therefore, talk of a European Strategic Culture 58 is premature in 
light of recent divisions over Iraq which are exacerbated by a noticeable failure of 
states within the enlarged transatlantic security community of the post-Cold War 
world to achieve a semblance of strategic and military doctrinal orthodoxy in the face 
of the growing complexity of contemporary security policy.59  
 
The debates on CFSP within the latest long-running Intergovernmental 
Conference (IGC) in 2003 - 2004 have not been straightforward. The suggestion by 
the Italian Council Presidency in the second half of 2003 for the extension of QMV in 
matters relating to defence and the proposal to include a mutual defence clause within 
the treaty was met with a frosty reception in Whitehall.60 Likewise, the suggestion for 
a separate ESDP planning cell to be set up in Tervuren was considered a British ‘red 
line’ issue. The compromise which the UK was able to forge with France was that the 
reduced planning capability which could operate separate from NATO could be 
situated within the European Union Military Staff in Brussels. 
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 Debates about ESDP have largely focused on institutional arrangements, 
rather than the business of constructing shared norms and developing a European 
military culture. The UK has consistently sought to ally itself with America in terms 
of hard security, and the Kosovo war and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 have only 
reinforced in the minds of the MoD that the military relationship with the United 
States should be privileged above all others. Nevertheless, the UK remains the 
lynchpin of any credible European military outfit and has been committed to building 
capabilities on the basis that they do not upset transatlantic arrangements, namely, that 
the United States has confidence that any EU capabilities will not become a rival 
venture.61  
 
One of the difficulties in establishing a credible ESDP lies in the vast range of 
military capabilities which the EU member states possess – from the UK and France 
down to tiny Luxembourg. Yet despite this, it is imperative that the EU is effective in 
crisis management, inclusive in ensuring that all member states are represented and is 
viewed as a legitimate and credible international actor. Yet the ‘capabilities-
expectations gap’ which Christopher Hill identified has still to be satisfactorily 
resolved.62 If the Franco-German tandem is to carry on regardless of British 
scepticism on European defence, the creation of an ESDP avant-garde will 
compromise any hope of achieving a common European foreign and security policy, 
and EU foreign policy might resemble the so-called ‘coalitions of the willing’ of 
which some EU Member States criticise the United States of employing today. 
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Despite this, a significant step forward in working towards greater cohesion on 
the strategic level among EU Member States has been the publishing of the European 
Security Strategy in December 2003.63 The aim of the document is to outline the 
challenges and opportunities facing the EU in foreign affairs, and to agree upon a 
common set of principles on which the EU of twenty-five Member States can agree 
on. Whilst the European Security Strategy does not represent a fundamental stage in 
the development of a European Strategic Culture, it does provide the basis on which 
discussion among the twenty-five can proceed. It is incumbent on the UK as the EU’s 
leading military power to take the lead in developing greater effectiveness in EU 
capabilities, especially in light of the EU taking over from the NATO Stabilisation 
Force (SFOR) in Bosnia from the second half of 2004. British-French-German plans 
to develop, small, rapidly deployable ‘Battle Groups’, is yet another example of the 
UK’s plans to improve EU military capabilities.64
 
The enlargement of the European Union has always increased the scope of EU 
foreign and security policy, as new members introduce new foreign and security 
policy interests and traditions. The diplomatic fall-out over Iraq uncovered that the 
UK stands to gain important allies in the 2004 enlargement of the EU to twenty-five 
states. Above all, Poland displayed its avowedly Atlanticist views through its support 
of America and Britain’s line on the Iraq issue.65 Whilst the UK has received strong 
support for its policy line from Poland, the UK does not share Poland’s scepticism 
over the development of ESDP and its impact on transatlantic relations and has tried 
to temper Poland’s attitude to the development of EU military capabilities. The UK 
and the USA have encouraged Polish involvement in the development of ESDP. At 
the Feira European Council summit in June 2000, the UK was active in supporting 
 23
Polish proposals for the inclusion of the EU applicant states in discussions on ESDP.66 
The UK then is well placed to play an influential role within CFSP in an enlarged EU. 
 
NATO and EU enlargement have always been parallel processes in which 
Western Europe has sought to expand the zone of peace and stability further to the 
east.67 NATO enlargement in the eyes of the candidate states has also been a means to 
lock-in American involvement on the continent. The UK has been committed to both 
processes of enlargement and the UK armed forces have been highly active in training 
candidate states in the ways of the Atlantic Alliance in advance of their accession. In 
this way, the UK has sought to provide an example of how armed forces may be 
integrated as a democratically accountable civic institution within a nation-state. The 
socialisation into the methods and norms of NATO has been a key task within such 
projects as the NATO’s Partnership for Peace strategy. 
 
Enlargement of the EU and NATO has been central to the future security and 
stability of Europe in the post-Cold War era. However, the hope of overcoming the 
Cold War divisions of Europe and reaping the rewards of a peace dividend has not 
lessened the demands placed on the British armed forces. In particular, events since 
11th September 2001 have seen the UK place greater emphasis on the use of force in 
international affairs within the context of the American-led ‘war on terror’, as outlined 
in Figure 1. Blair’s engagement in international politics has placed considerable 
demands on the UK’s military resources, and in the cases of Kosovo, Afghanistan and 
Iraq, involved engaging in war fighting. This has resulted in the prevalence of hard 
security measures in British foreign policy under the Blair government, which has 
necessitated the maintenance of strong military ties with the USA and complicated the 
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development of EU capabilities with the UK’s European partners. With this in mind it 
is clear that Tony Blair has not always been able to link the four aspects of his foreign 
policy nexus, as outlined above. The continued reliance on the USA in military 
matters and the failure to implement radical change in the UK’s foreign policy has 
meant that continuity has defined the UK’s strategic culture under Tony Blair, rather 
than witnessing a Blair foreign policy revolution. 
Conclusions 
 
The UK is a major diplomatic and military player in today’s world. There are a 
number of reasons for this. Mangold neatly sums up the range of resources that the 
UK draws on within its foreign and security policy culture. 
 
Military power is complemented by what has become a well rehearsed list of 
more tangible assets – the global primacy of the English language, the 
reputation of the BBC world service, an unusually long democratic tradition, 
commitment to the rule of law, and London’s role as an international financial 
centre. In an era of globalisation, Britain has the advantage of a wide range of 
international contacts, spanning the developed and the developing world. Its 
membership of some 120 international organisations includes the most 
important international clubs, NATO, the EU, G-8, the OECD, the 
Commonwealth and the UN Security Council, of which it has permanent 
membership. This is an almost unique combination of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power, 




Maintaining close multilateral ties with its key partners has been central to British 
strategic culture since World War Two. NATO and the European Union have been 
central institutions for the pursuit of British interests. 
 
The current government’s aim of framing an integrated foreign policy 
consisting of four pillars - an interventionist foreign policy, a belief in developing 
more adequate burden-sharing within the transatlantic security community, and the 
continued aim to promote the UK’s international interest - has presented the UK with 
a number of challenges. Blair has had to convince the British public that the UK must 
play a leading role in world affairs, even if this involves the deployment of the armed 
forces around the globe. By fashioning a framework of action within the Labour 
party’s belief in an integrated foreign policy, the government has sought to outline the 
deployment of British troops within an overall strategy of the doctrine of international 
community. This is the key belief that drives Tony Blair, but public perceptions have 
been of a prime minister following American leads rather than defining a clear 
rationale for British foreign policy actions. 
 
The principles underlining the use of the armed forces have not dramatically 
changed since Labour took power in 1997. However, the circumstances in which they 
are used, based on the post-11th September 2001 environment and in the campaign 
against international terrorism, has impacted upon UK strategic culture as a whole. 
The UK’s unflinching support of the USA in the war on Iraq has complicated the 
shifts made in British strategic thinking in the form of the initial moves since St Malo 
to work towards building European military capabilities. America’s ‘divide and 
conquer’ tactics have meant that a European strategic culture remains a distant hope 
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for most Europeans, particularly in light of the enlargement of the EU in 2004 to 
include member states with strong affinities to NATO and the security relationship 
with the USA. 
 
The UK remains a highly engaged international actor, whose colonial past, 
combined with its multilateral links, give it a global reach and relative influence that 
few states can match. Shifts in the European security environment since the end of the 
Cold War, and the insecurity that characterises the post-11th September 2001 world 
have challenged the UK’s ability to adapt effectively to new foreign policy problems. 
In particular, the balance that the UK has sought to strike concerning Atlanticist and 
Europeanist visions of security policy has come under increasing strain. Due to the 
current upheavals in international order, the UK has not sought radical upheaval of its 
foreign and security policy. Despite Blair’s efforts to shape the development of 
European military capabilities to reinforce transatlantic burden sharing, events have 
consistently forced Blair’s foreign policy to be largely reactive in scope. Thus, Blair 
has not initiated substantial change in UK strategic culture, preferring to try and 
maintain the UK’s current position within the transatlantic community.  
 27
 Biographical Note 
Alister Miskimmon is Lecturer in European Politics / International Relations at Royal 
Holloway, University of London. His recent publications include, Miskimmon, A. & 
Paterson, W. E. (2003) "Foreign and Security Policy: On the Cusp between 
Transformation and Accommodation" in Dyson, K. & Goetz, K. H. (eds.) Germany, 
Europe and the Politics of Constraint, Oxford University Press / Proceedings of the 
British Academy No.119, pp.325-345 and Miskimmon, A. & Wright, J. (forthcoming 
2004) ‘The Changing Constitution of Security in Europe’, Review of Constitutional 













Promoting the British National Interest 
 
Figure 1: The Blair Foreign Policy Nexus 
 28
                                                  
1 Many thanks to Dr Steven Haines and Dr Joanne Wright, Royal Holloway, 
University of London, for their helpful comments on the initial drafts of this 
contribution. 
2 Article 2, paragraph 4 of the UN Charter states: “All states shall refrain from the 
threat or use of force in their international relations”, with Article 51 of the Charter 
outlining the conditions of individual or collective self-defence as the only legal use 
of force. Pre-emptive self-defence is not explicitly ruled out, nor is it ruled in. See 
Weiss T G, Forsythe D P & Coate R A (2004) The United Nations and Changing 
World Politics, 4th Edition, Oxford, Westview Press, pp.3-28. 
3 House of Commons Defence Committee (2004) Lessons of Iraq, Third Report of 
Session 2003-2004, Vol. I & II, HC57-1, 16th March 2004, London, The Stationary 
Office Ltd. 
4 Longhurst, K. (2004) In this volume 
5 Ministry of Defence / The Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre (2001) British 
Defence Doctrine, 2nd Edition, Shrivenham, pp.2-3 – 2-4. 
6 See Mangold, P. (2001) Success and Failure in British Foreign Policy: Evaluating 
the Record, 1900-2000, Houndmills, Palgrave; Baylis, J. (1986) ‘”Greenwoodery” 
and British Defence Policy’, International Affairs, Vol.62, No.3, pp.443-457. 
7 Grant, C. (2000) Intimate Relations: Can Britain play a leading role in European 
defence – and keep its special links to US intelligence, Centre for European Reform 
Working Paper, May 2000. 
8 DePorte, A. W. (1979) Europe between the superpowers, Yale, Yale University 
Press; Smith, M. (1984) Western Europe and the United States, London, Allen and 
Unwin; Ullman, R. (1991) Securing Europe, Princeton, Princeton University Press; 
Heuser, B. (1999) NATO, Britain, France and the FRG: Nuclear strategies and forces 
for Europe, 1949-2000, London, MacMillan. 
9 Smith, M. E. (2003) Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalisation 
of Co-operation, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; Nuttall, S. (1992) 
European Political Co-operation, Oxford, Clarendon Press. 
10 Buzan, B. & Waever, O. (2003) Regions and Powers: The Structure of 
International Security, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
11 Ibid. p.44. 
12 Wallace, W. (1992) ‘British foreign policy after the Cold War’, International 
Affairs, Vol.68, No.3, pp.423-442. 
13 For an examination of institutional developments see, Miskimmon, A. & Wright, J. 
(forthcoming 2004) ‘The Changing Constitution of Security in Europe’, Special Issue 
Review of Constitutional Studies, Univeristy of Edmonton, Alberta.  
14 NATO’s New Strategic Concept, July 1990, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-
95/c911107a.htm; Declaration of the Heads of State and Government, Ministerial 
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council / North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NATO 
Headquarters, Brussels, 10-11 January 1994, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-
95/c940111a.htm; Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council (NAC) / North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) Berlin, 3-4 June 1996, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/comm96.htm; Washington Summit Communiqué 
Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the 
North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C. on 24th April 1999, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm; The Alliance's Strategic Concept 
                                                                                                                                            
Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the 
North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 23rd and 24th April 1999, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm  
15 van Evera, S. (1990) ‘Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War,’ International 
Security, Vol.15, No.3, pp.7-57; Sloan, S. R. (1990) ‘NATO’s future in a new 
Europe,’ International Affairs, Vol.66, No.3, pp.495-512; Ullman, R. (1990) 
‘Enlarging the zone of peace,’ Foreign Policy, No.80, pp.102-120; Meuller, J. (1989) 
‘A New Concert of Europe,’ Foreign Policy, No.77, pp.3-16; Kupchan, C. & 
Kupchan, C. (1991) ‘Concerts, Collective Security and the Future of Europe,’ 
International Security, Vol.16, No.1, pp.114-161; Keohane, R. & Martin, L. (1995) 
‘The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,’ International Security, Vol.20, No.1, pp.39-
51. 
16 Declaration of the Heads of State and Government, Ministerial Meeting of the 
North Atlantic Council / North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NATO Headquarters, 
Brussels, 10-11 January 1994, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940111a.htm
17 Hoon, G. (2003) Delivering Security in a Changing World, Defence White Paper, 
Ministry of Defence, London. 
18 Hoon, G. (2003) ‘Britain’s Armed forces for tomorrow’s defence’, Speech to the 
Royal United Services Institute, 26th June 2003, http://www.rusi.org/cgi-
bin/public/view.cgi?object=obj113&uniqueid=PR00016
19 Interview in UK Permanent Representation to the European Union (UKREP), 
Brussels, 30th June 2003. 
20 MoD (1998) Strategic Defence Review, http://www.mod.uk/ 
21 Hoon, G. (2003) Delivering Security in a Changing World, Defence White Paper, 
Vol.1, Ministry of Defence, London, 
http://www.mod.uk/linked_files/publications/whitepaper2003/volume1.pdf; MoD 
(2002) The Strategic Defence Review: New Chapter, Ministry of Defence, London, 
http://www.mod.uk/issues/sdr/newchapter.htm. 
22 Interview in UKREP, Brussels, 30th June 2003. 
23 Interview in the Ständige Vertretung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland am 
Europäischen Union, Brussels, 3rd July 2003. 
24 I thank Dr Steven Haines for this point. 
25 Ministry of Defence / The Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre (2001) British 
Defence Doctrine, 2nd Edition, Shrivenham, p.6-1. 
26 Blair, T. (1999) Speech by the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, to the Economic Club of 
Chicago, Hilton Hotel, Chicago, USA, 22nd April 1999, reproduced at: 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/politics/blair.htm. See also Annan, K. (1999) 
‘Two Concepts of Sovereignty’, The Economist, 18th September 1999. 
27 See MORI Polls Public opinion and foreign policy See MORI - 
http://www.mori.com/polls/1999/ms990327.shtml; 
http://www.mori.com/polls/2001/ukwgmd.shtml; 
http://www.mori.com/polls/trends/conflict-trends.shtml; Views on Europe: 1996 - 
http://www.mori.com/polls/1996/eu961129.shtml; 1997 - 
http://www.mori.com/polls/1997/s971114.shtml; 1999 - 
http://www.mori.com/polls/1999/st990611.shtml; 2000 - 
http://www.mori.com/polls/2000/notw.shtml; 
European Army: 2000 - http://www.mori.com/polls/2000/ms001125.shtml; British 
Identity 1999: http://www.mori.com/polls/1999/ec990927.shtml; Attitudes to America 
 30
                                                                                                                                            
and Americans: 2002 - http://www.mori.com/polls/2002/americans.shtml; Views on 
France 2003 - http://www.mori.com/polls/2003/mpm030415.shtml
28 Falk, R. A. (1999) ‘Kosovo, World Order, and the Future of International Law’, 
American Journal of International Law, Vol.93, No.4, pp.847-857. 
29 Cooper, R. (2003) ‘The New Liberal Imperialism’, The Observer, 7th April 2003; 
see also Cooper, R. (2000) The Postmodern State and the World Order, London, 
Demos Paper No.19, http:www.demos.co.uk/thepostmodernstate_page83.aspx 
30 For a discussion on regional security issues see Lemke, D. (2002) Regions of War 
and Peace, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; For the classic study on 
international anarchy and mediating its effects see, Bull, H. (1977) The Anarchical 
Society, A Study of Order in World Politics, Columbia University Press, New York 
31 Miskimmon, A. & Sloam, J. (2003) 'Assessing the impact of Social Democracy on 
European Union Foreign Policy', Paper to be presented at the UACES 33rd Annual 
Conference and 8th Research Conference - The European Union: The First Ten Years, 
The Next Ten Years? University of Newcastle, 2-4 September 2003. 
32 Blair, T. (2003) ‘Never forget we are the change-makers’, Speech to the 
Progressive Governance Conference in London, 11th July 2003, www.labour.org.uk 
33 Clinton, W. J. (2003) The Next Ideas Battle, www.progressive-governance.net 
34 For example, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (1998) Annual Report on Human 
Rights, Department for International Development, http://www.fco.gov.uk/ 
35 Bartlett, W. (2000) ‘Simply the right thing to do’: Labour goes to war, in Little, R. 
& Wickham-Jones, M. (2000) New Labour’s Foreign Policy: a Moral crusade?, 
Manchester, Manchester University Press, pp.131-146. 
36 Cooper, N. (2000) ‘The pariah agenda and New Labour’s ethical arms sales policy’, 
in Little, R. & Wickham-Jones, M. (2000) New Labour’s Foreign Policy: a Moral 
crusade?, Manchester, Manchester University Press, pp.147-167. 
37 Ministry of Defence (2001) ‘European Defence’, Policy Paper No.3, 
http://www.mod.uk/issues/cooperation/eurodefence.htm; Ministry of Defence (2000) 
‘Defence Diplomacy’, Policy Paper No.1, 
http://www.mod.uk/issues/cooperation/diplomacy.htm 
38 Holden, R. (2003) The Making of New Labour’s European Policy, Houndmills, 
Palgrave. 
39 Hill, C. (2004) ‘Renationalizing or Regrouping? EU Foreign Policy Since 11 
September 2001’, Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 42 No.1, pp.143-163. See 
also, Howarth, J. (2000) “Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative”, 
Survival, Vol.42, No.2, pp. 33-55; Howarth, J. (2000) “Britain, NATO and CESDP: 
fixed strategy, changing tactics”, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol.5, No.3, 
pp.1-20. 
40 In the immediate aftermath of the St Malo agreement and moves towards 
establishing ESDP, the 1999 Defence White Paper sought to stress that the 
development of European capabilities would strengthen, rather than compromise, 
transatlantic security relations founded on NATO. MoD (1999) Defence White Paper, 
http://www.mod.uk/publications/whitepaper1999/ 
41 Speech by Prime Minister Tony Blair to the North Atlantic Assembly, International 
Conference Centre, Edinburgh, 13 November 1998. 
42 Some of Grant’s working papers on the topic include – especially “Can Britain lead 
in Europe?”, October 1998; “European defence post-Kosovo”, June 1999; “Intimate 
Relations”, May 2000. http://www.cer.org.uk/  
 31
                                                                                                                                            
43 Smith, J. & Tsatsas, M. (2002) The New Bilateralism: The UK’s relations within 
the EU, Royal Institute for International Affairs, European Programme. 
44 Réflexion sur le mode d’emploi pour la mise en oeuvre practique de l’article J.4.2 
du Traité de Maastricht, compt-rendu officieux de séminaire 17.4.1997 organisé par la 
présidence francaise réunissant les directeurs des affairs stratégiques des ministieres 
des affaires étrangeres des pays de l’UEO. 
45 MoD (1999) The Defence White Paper, 
http://www.mod.uk/publications/whitepaper1999/, paragraph 13. 
46 Lindley-French, J. et al (2000) Coalitions and the future of UK security policy, 
Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), Whitehall Paper Series, No.50. 
47 Interviews in Ministry of Defence, London, 29th January 2000 & 12th July 2002; 
UKREP Brussels 30th June 2003,; see also Richard Hatfield’s ‘Food for Thought’ 
paper on building European military capabilities, reprinted in Rutten, M. (2000) From 
St Malo to Nice – European Defence: Core Documents, Chaillot Paper No.47, 
European Union Institute for Security Studies, pp.115-121. 
48 Blair, T. (2000) ‘Europe’s Political Future’, Speech by the Prime Minister, Tony 
Blair, to the Polish Stock Exchange, Warsaw, 6th October 2000, Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, www.fco.gov.uk/news/speechtext.asp?4913
49 However, in a poll conducted by MORI concerning the development of the ERRF 
and the UK’s role within the project, 55% of respondents, against 38% against stated 
that it was correct that Blair should seek to co-operate in such matters with his 
European colleagues. MORI (2000) European Integrated Army Poll, 26th November 
2000. In another poll conducted by MORI in 1996, 48% of respondents thought that 
there should be a fully integrated armed services to defend Europe. 
50 Blair, T. (2001) Speech to the European Research Institute, University of 
Birmingham, 23rd November 2001, http://www.number-10.gov.uk/  
51 Interview with UK official, NATO, 1st July 2003. 
52 Interview with UK official, UKREP, Brussels, 30th June 2003. 
53 Hall, B., Parker, G. & Dempsey, J. (2003) ‘Blair deal on EU defence may offend 
Bush, Financial Times, 28th November 2003. 
54 Kagan, R. (2003) Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World 
Order, London, Atlantic Books. Since the beginning of the 1990s there have been a 
raft of texts dealing with the feasibility of the Atlantic Alliance in the post-Cold War 
era. These include: Daalder, I. (2001) ‘Are the United States and Europe heading for a 
divorce?’, International Affairs, Vol.77, No.2, pp.553-567; Calleo, D. (2001) 
Rethinking Europe's Future; Princeton, Princeton University Press; Blackwill, R. D. 
(1999) The Future of Transatlantic Relations; New York, Council on Foreign 
Relations; Gordon, P. H. (2003) ‘Bridging the Atlantic Divide’. Foreign Affairs, No. 
82, pp.70-83; Kennedy, C. & Bouton, M. M. (2002) 'The Real Trans-Atlantic Gap', 
Foreign Policy, No.133, pp.66-74; Patten, C. (2001) ‘Devotion or divorce? The future 
of transatlantic relations’ European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol.6, No.3, pp.287-290; 
Yost, D. S. (2002) ‘Transatlantic relations and peace in Europe’, International Affairs, 
Vol. 78, No. 2, pp. 277-300; Wallace, W. (2001) ‘Europe the Necessary Partner’, 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 3, pp.16-34; Moisi, D. (2001) ‘The Real Crisis over the 
Atlantic’; Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No.4, pp.149-54; Blinken, A. J. (2001) ‘The False 
Crisis over the Atlantic’. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No.3, pp.35-49; Everts, S. (2001) 
‘Unilateral America, Lightweight Europe? Managing divergence in transatlantic 
foreign policy’, Centre for European Reform Working Paper (February 2001); Nye, J. 
S (2000) ‘Continental drift’, International Affairs, Vol.76, No.1, pp.51-59; Van 
 32
                                                                                                                                            
Heuven, M. & Treverton, G. F. (1998) ‘Europe and America: How Will the United 
States Adjust to the New Partnership?’ RAND National Defense Research Institute 
Issue paper no.171, http://www.rand.org/publications/IP/IP171/; Gedmin, J. (2002) 
‘Transatlantic Ties after 9/11: An American View’. Internationale Politik, Vol. 3, Fall 
issue; pp. 13-18; 
55 Slocombe, W. B. (2003) ‘Force, Pre-emption and Legitimacy’, Survival, Vol.45, 
No.1, pp.117-130. 
56 A poll conducted by MORI in July 2001suggested that rather than increasing the 
UK’s security, involvement in America’s NMD programme would encourage a new 
arms race and destabilise the international order. For the polls findings see, MORI 
(2001) ‘70% of Britain fears a US driven arms race’, 18th July 2001, 
http://www.mori.com/polls/2001/ukwgmd.shtml 
57 Lindley-French, J. (2002) ‘In the shade of Locarno: why European defence is 
failing’, International Affairs, Vol.78, No.4, pp.789-811. 
58 Cornish, P. & Edwards, G. (2001) ‘Beyond the EU/NATO dichotomy: The 
beginnings of a European strategic culture,’ International Affairs, Vol.77,  No.3, 
pp.587-603; Gray, C. (1999) “Strategic culture as context: the first generation of 
theory strikes back,” Review of International Studies, Vol.25, No.1, pp.49-69; 
Heiselberg, S. (2003) “Pacifism or Activism: Towards a Common Strategic Culture 
within the European Security and Defense Policy?,” IIS Working Paper 2003/4, 
Copenhagen. 
59 Clarke, M. & Cornish, P. (2002) ‘The European Defence Project and the Prague 
Summit’, International Affairs, Vol. 78, No.4, pp.777-788. 
60 Italian Council Presidency (2003) 25th November 2003, Presidency proposal (doc. 
IGC 52/1/03 REV1; Hall, B., Parker, G. & Dempsey, J. (2003) ‘Blair deal on EU 
defence may offend Bush’, Financial Times, 28th November 2003. 
61 The classic example is of American suspicion of European aims is the 
‘Bartholomew Telegram’, reproduced in van Eekeln, W. (1998) Debating European 
Security, 1948-1998, CEPS, published in co-operation with Sdu, The Hague; Stanley 
Sloan sums up the American position on the development of ESDP as a ‘yes, but…’ 
attitude – supportive in theory, but unsure whether it will be successful and in the best 
interests of the transatlantic security community’; Sloan, S. R. (2000) The United 
States and European Defence, Chaillot Paper No.39, EU Institute for Security Studies, 
Paris, http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai39e.pdf 
62 Hill, C. (1993) The Capability-Expectations Gap or Conceptualizing Europe's 
International Role. Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.31, No.3, pp.305-28. 
63 European Security Strategy (2003) ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, available 
at, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris, http://www.iss-
eu.org/solana/solanae.pdf 
64 Norton-Taylor, R. (2004) ‘UK to join rapid reaction force: New EU battle groups 
for deployment to failing states’, The Guardian, 11  th February, 2004, p. 10. 
65 Spanish sponsored “Group of Eight Letter” supporting America’s position on Iraq, 
Aznar, J. M. et al (2003) Letter to The Times, The Times, 30th January 2003, 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk 
66 Zaborowski, M. & Longhurst, K. (2003) ‘America's Protégé in the East? The 
Emergence of Poland as a Regional Leader’ International Affairs, Vol.79, No.5, 
pp.1009-1028.
67 Batt, J. et al (2003) Partners and neighbours: A CFSP for a wider Europe, Chaillot 
Paper, No.64, September 2003, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris. 
 33
                                                                                                                                            
68 Mangold, P. (2001) Success and Failure in British Foreign Policy: Evaluating the 
Record, 1900-2000, Houndmills, Palgrave, p.168. 
 
 34
